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Objective 
In this paper Module 1 in 4 of a Short Course on Risk and Reliability in Civil Engineering, 
Malta, March 21-23, 2001 is printed. 
The full 4-module course will provide a background on statistical methods, reliability theory 
and risk analysis for civil engineers and other professionals with little or no prior training in 
the field . The aim of the course is to provide a basis for the understanding of the topics 
addressed in the Conference. The full course includes the following four main sessions: 
Module 1: 
Module 2: 
Module 3: 
Module 4: 
Risk Analysis in Civil Engineering 
Uncertainty Modelling and Bayesian Statistics 
Methods of Risk and Reliability Analysis 
Applications in Civil Engineering 
(P. Thoft- Christensen) 
(M.H.Faber) 
(Darbre) 
(N.P. HoJ) 
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Module 1 
Risk Analysis in Civil Engineering 
1. Introduction 
Until fairly recently there has been a tendency for structural engineering to be dominated 
by deterministic thinking, characterised in design calculations by the use of specified 
minimum material properties, specified load intensities and by prescribed procedures for 
computing stresses and deflections. This deterministic approach has almost certainly been 
reinforced by the vary large extent to which structural engineering design is codified and 
the lack of feed-back about the actual performance of structures. For example, the actual 
stresses are rarely known, deflections are rarely observed or monitored, and since most 
structures do not collapse the real reserves of strengths are generally not known. In 
contrast, in the field of hydraulic systems, much more is known about the actual 
performance of, say, pipe networks, weirs, spillways, etc., as their performance in service 
can be relatively easily observed or determined. 
The lack of information about the actual behaviour of structures combined with the use of 
codes embodying relatively high safety factors can lead to the view, still held by some 
engineers as well as by some members of the general public, that absolute safety can be 
achieved. Absolute safety is of course unobtainable; and such a goal is also undesirable, 
·since absolute safety could be achieved only by deploying infinite resources. 
lt is now widely recognised, however, that some risk of unacceptable structural 
performance must be tolerated. The main object of structural design is therefore to ensure, 
at an acceptable level of probability, which each structure will not become unfit for its 
intended purpose at any time during its specified design life. Most structures, however, 
have multiple performance requirements, commonly expressed in terms of a set of 
serviceability and ultimate limit states, most of which are not independent; and thus the 
problem is much more complex than the specification of just a single probability. 
This module is primarily based on Thoft-Christensen & Baker (1982), Thoft-Christensen & 
Thoft-Christensen & Murotsu (1986) and Thoft-Christensen (1997M1998). 
1.1. Current Risk Levels 
As a means of assessing the relative importance of structural failures as a cause of death, 
some comparative statistics for the U.K. are given in table 1 for a number of causes. 
These figures show that, at least for a typical Western European country, the risk to life 
from structural failures is negligible. For the 3 year period reported, the average number of 
deaths per annum directly attributable to structural failure was 14, divided almost equally 
between failures occurring during construction and the failures of completed structures. 
Other structural failures occur in which there are no deaths or personal injuries; but data 
on such failures are more difficult to assemble because in many countries they do not 
have to be reported. 
In comparing the relative risks given in table 1, account should be taken of differences in 
exposure time typical for the various activities. For example, although air travel is 
associated with a high risk per hour, a typical passenger may be exposed for between 
4 
only, say, 10 - 100 hours per year, leading to a risk of death of between 1 o-5 and 10 -4 per 
year. In contrast, most people spend at least 70% of their life indoors and are therefore 
exposed to the possible effects of structural failure; but this leads to an average annual 
risk per person of only 10-7. Nevertheless, the only fair basis for comparing the risk is 
comparison with the inescapable minimum risk that has to be accepted by an individyal 
member of society as beyond his control and for which no blame can be attributed to other 
people - for example, the risk of death by disease. Many people accept voluntary risks 
many orders of magnitude higher, but these should not be taken into account when 
considering structural safety. 
Activity/Cause Number of deaths per 
hour per 1 08 persons 
Mountaineering (international) 2700 
Air travel (international) 120 
Deep water trawling 59 
Car travel 56 
Coal mining 21 
Construction sites 7.7 
Manufacturing 2.0 
Accidents at home (all) 2.1 
Accidents at home (able-bodied persons) 0.7 
Fire at home 0.1 
STRUCTURAL FAILURES 0.002 
Table 1. Comparative death risks. [Average 1970-1973 in UK. based on Central Statistical Office, 
Abstract 19U]. Takenfrom Thoft-Christensen & Baker (1982) 
In assessing the importance of structural failures, account should also be taken of the 
economic consequences of collapse and unserviceability. In fact the economic aspects 
may be regarded as dominant since the marginal returns in terms of lives saved for each 
additional it 1 million invested in improving the safety of structures may be small in 
comparison with the benefits of investing the same sum in, say, road safety or health care. 
However, structures should, where possible, be designed in such a way that there is 
ample warning of impending failure and with brittle failure modes having larger safety 
margins than ductile modes (i.e. higher reliabilities). 
1.2. Structural Codes 
Most structural design is undertaken in accordance with codes of practice, which in many 
countries have legal status. Structural codes typically and properly have a deterministic 
format and describe what are considered to be the minimum standards for design, 
construction and workmanship for each type of structure. Most codes can be seen to be 
evolutionary in nature, with changes being introduced or major revisions made at intervals 
of 3 - 10 years to allow for new types of structural form (e.g. reinforced masonry), the 
effects of improved understanding of structural behaviour (e.g. of stiffened plated 
structures), the effects of changes in manufacturing tolerances or quality control 
procedures, a better knowledge of loads, etc. 
Until recently, structural codes could be considered to be documents in which current good 
practice was codified; and these documents could be relied upon to produce safe, if not 
economic, structures. These high standards of safety were achieved for the majority of 
structures, not from an understanding of all the uncertainties that affect the loading and 
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response, but by codifying practice that was known by experience to be satisfactory. The 
recent generation of structural codes, including the Euro-codes and the associated model 
codes for steel and concrete, are however more scientific in nature. They typically cover a 
wider range of structural elements and incorporate the results of much experimental and 
theoretical research. They are also more complex documents to assimilate and to us~ and 
the associated design costs are consequently higher, as are the risks of errors in 
interpretation. 
The benefits of these new codes must therefore lie in the possibility of: 
• increased overall safety for the same construction costs; 
• the same or more consistent levels of safety with reduced construction costs; 
• or, a combination of these two. 
A further aim should be the trend, where appropriate, towards design procedures, which 
can be applied with confidence to completely new forms of construction without the prior 
need for prototype testing. The aims and benefits described above can only be achieved 
by a rational assessment of the various uncertainties associated with each type of 
structure and a study of their interactions. This is the essence of structural reliability 
analysis. 
2. Uncertainty 
2.1. General 
Structural reliability analysis is concerned with the rational treatment of uncertainties in 
structurat engineering design and the associated problems of rational decision-making. All 
quantities (except physical and mathematical constants) that currently enter into 
engineering calculations are in reality associated with some uncertainty. This fact has 
been implicitly recognised in current and previous codes. If this were not the case, a 
"safety factor" only slightly in excess of unity would suffice in all circumstances. The 
determination of appropriate standards of safety requires the quantification of these 
uncertainties by some appropriate means and a study of their interaction for the structure 
under consideration. 
lt is sometimes argued that the magnitudes of all variables are either bounded or can be 
restricted within specified limits, and that these bounding values should be used as the 
basis for design. However, in structural engineering 
• upper limits to individual loads and lower limits to material strength are not easily 
identified in practice (e.g. the cube or cylinder strength of concrete); 
• even if such natural limits exist, their direct use in design is likely to be extremely 
uneconomic; 
• limits imposed by quality control and testing can never be completely effective, 
particularly in the case of properties which can be measured only by destructive 
tests or in circumstances in which changes in the potential properties take place 
between sampling and use of the material (e.g. concrete); 
• even if recognisable limits do exist, their use may not always be rational. 
Example 1. Consider a column supporting n floors of a building on which the 
loads are known to vary independently with time. Assuming that the load on 
each floor is physically restricted by some hypothetical fail-safe device so 
that under no circumstances can it exceed some specified maximum value, 
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and given that each load stays at its maximum value for, say, 1% of the time, 
the rational design load for the column can generally be shown to be less 
than the sum of the maximum loads. This design load will, of course, depend 
on the number of storeys supported and the design life of the structure. 
p 
10-u -+-----.---..,..-----,......,.-;;--, 
p = 0. 1 
5 10 15 
No. of storeys supported 
Figure 1. 
Figure 1 shows the probabilities P that the maximum column load at ground 
level will reach the sum of the maxima of the individual floor loads (i.e. the 
maximum possible column load) at some time during a 50 year period, on 
the assumption that the floor loads are mutually independent, that they 
remain constant for an hour and then change to some new random value, 
and that each has a 1% chance (p = 0.01) of being at its maximum value 
after each renewal (i.e. each floor is loaded to its maximum value for 
approximately 1% of the time). The figure shows that even with only six 
floors, the probability that the maximum possible column load occurs is as 
small as 1 o-6 in 50 years. Even if each floor is loaded to its maximum value 
for about 10% of the time (p = 0.1 ), the probability of the maximum possible 
column load occurring is still very small if the number of floors supported is 
10 or more. 
In such cases, it would be irrational and uneconomic to design for this worst 
possible condition. However, it should be noted that in practice the degree of 
conservatism depends on whether the individual floor loads are in fact 
independent; and the acceptable risk level is governed by the consequences 
of failure and the rapidity with which failure occurs. Some knowledge of the 
probabilities of occurrence of loads less than the maximum would also be 
required for each floor for a rational design. 
2.2. Basic Variables 
For the purposes of quantifying uncertainties in the field of structural engineering and for 
subsequent reliability analysis it is necessary to define a set of basic variables. These are 
defined as the set of basic quantities governing the static or dynamic response of the 
structure. 
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Basic variables are quantities such as mechanical properties of materials, unit weights, 
environmental loads, etc. They are basic in the sense that they are the most fundamental 
quantities normally recognised and used by designers and analysts in structural 
calculations. Thus, the yield stress of steel can be considered as a basic variable, although 
this property is itself dependent on chemical composition and various micro-structural 
parameters. 
lt should also be mentioned that it is generally impracticable to try to obtain sufficient 
statistical data to model the variations in the strength of complete structural component 
directly. Reliance must be placed on the ability of the analyst to synthesise this higher-
level information when required. 
Ideally, basic variables should be chosen so that they are statistically independent 
quantities. However, this may not always be possible if the strength of a structure is known 
to be dependent on, for example, any two mechanical properties that are known to be 
correlated, e.g. the tensile strength and the compressive strength of a batch of concrete. 
2.3. Types of Uncertainty 
For the purposes of structural reliability analysis it is necessary to distinguish between at 
least three types of uncertainty - physical uncertainty, statistical uncertainty and model 
uncertainty. lt should be noted that in the following, random variables will be denoted by 
upper case letters, e.g. X, and their outcomes by lower case, e.g. x. 
Physical uncertainty: Whether or not a structural element fails when loaded depends in 
part on the actual values of the relevant material properties that govern its strength. The 
reliability analyst must therefore be concerned with the nature of the actual variability of 
physical quantities, such as loads, material properties and dimensions. This variability can 
be described in terms of probability distributions or stochastic processes. However, 
physical variability can be quantified only by examining sample data; but, since sample 
sizes are limited by practical and economic considerations, some uncertainty must remain. 
This practical limit gives rise to so-called statistical uncertainty. 
Statistical uncertainty: Statistics, as opposed to probability, is concerned with inference, 
and in particular with the inferences that can be drawn from sample observations. Data 
may be collected for the purposes of building a probabilistic model of the physical 
variability of some quantity, which will involve, firstly the selection of an appropriate 
probability distribution type, and then determination of numerical values for its parameters. 
Common probability distributions have between one and four parameters, which 
immediately place a lower bound on the sample size required, but in practice very large 
samples are required to establish reliable estimates of the numerical values of parameters. 
For a given set of data, therefore, the distribution parameters may themselves be 
considered to be random variables, the uncertainty in which is dependent on the amount of 
sample data - or, in general, on the amount of data and nay prior knowledge. This 
uncertainty is termed statistical uncertainty and, unlike physical variability, arises solely as 
a result of lack of information. 
Model uncertainty: Structural design and analysis make use of mathematical models 
relating desired output quantities (e.g. the deflection at the centre of a reinforced concrete 
beam) to the values of a set of input quantities or basic variables (e.g. load intensities, 
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modulus of elasticity, duration of loading, etc.). These models are generally deterministic in 
form (e.g. linear-elastic structural analysis) although they may be probabilistic (e.g. 
calculation of the peak response of an offshore structure to stochastic wave loading). 
Furthermore, they may be based on an intimate understanding of the mechanics of the 
problem (e.g. plastic collapse analysis of a steel portal frame) or they may be highly 
empirical (e.g. punching shear at tubular joint connections in offshore jacket structures). 
However, with very few exceptions, it is rarely possible to make highly accurate predictions 
about the magnitude of the response of typical civil engineering structures to loading even 
when the governing input quantities are known exactly. In other words, the response of 
typical structures and structural elements contains a component of uncertainty in addition 
to those components arising from uncertainties in the values of the basic loading and 
strength variables. This additional source of uncertainty is termed model uncertainty and 
occurs as a result of simplifying assumptions, unknown boundary conditions and as a 
result of the unknown effects of other variables and their interactions, which are not 
included in the model. 
The model uncertainty associated with a particular mathematical model may be expressed 
in terms of the probability distribution of a variable Xm defined as 
X = actl!al strength (response) 
m predicted strength (response) using model 
(1} 
In many components and structures, model uncertainties have a large effect on structural 
reliability and should not be neglected. 
I 
3. Structural Reliability Analysis and Safety Checking 
3.1 Structural Reliability 
The term structural reliability should be considered as having two meanings - a general 
one and a mathematical one. 
• In the most general sense, the reliability of a structure is its ability to fulfil its design 
purpose for some specified time. 
• In a narrow sense it is the probability that a structure will not attain each specified 
limit state (ultimate or serviceability) during a specified reference period. 
In this chapter we shall be concerned with structural reliability in the narrow sense and 
shall generally be treating each limit state or failure mode separately and explicitly. 
However, most structures and structural elements have a number of possible failure 
modes, and in determining the overall reliability of a structural system this must be taken 
into account, making due allowance for the correlations arising from common sources of 
loading and common material properties. 
However, although the definition above may seem clear, it is necessary to examine with 
care exactly what is meant by "the probability that a structure will not attain each specified 
limit state during a specified reference period". 
Consider first the need for defining a reference period. Because the majority of structural 
loads vary with time in an uncertain manner, the probability that any selected load intensity 
9 
will be exceeded in a fixed interval of time is a function of the length of that interval (and 
possibly the time at which it begins). Hence, in general, structural reliability is dependent 
on time of exposure to the loading environment. lt is also affected if material properties 
change with time. Only for the rare cases, when loads and strength are constant, can the 
reference period be ignored. In such cases the loads are applied once and the str.u$:ture 
either does or does not fail (e.g. when the structure or component is loaded entirely by its 
own self weight). 
The second question is more demanding. What is meant by "the probability that ... "? This 
is best explored by a simple example. 
Example 2. Assume that an offshore structure is idealised as a uniform vertical 
cantilever rigidly connected to the seabed. The structure will fail when the moment 
S induced at the root of the cantilever exceeds the flexural strength R. Assume 
further that R and S are random variables whose statistical distributions are known 
very precisely as a result of a very long series of measurements. R is a variable 
representing the variations in strength between nominally identical structures, 
whereas S represents the maximum load effects in successive T year periods. The 
distributions of R and S are both assumed to be stationary with time. Under these 
assumptions, the probability that the structure will collapse during any reference 
period of duration T years can then be shown to be given by -
ro 
P, = P(M ~ 0} = JFR(x)fs(X)dx (2) 
- eo 
where M = R- S and where FR is the probability function of R and fs the 
probability density function of S . 
Because of the definition of R and S in terms of frequentist probabilities, the probability 
determined from equation ( 2) may be interpreted as a long-run failure frequency. Similarly 
the reliability :R, defined as 
:R= 1 - Pr (3) 
may be interpreted as a long-run survival frequency or long-run reliability. :Rmay therefore 
be called a frequentist reliability. If, however, we focus our attention on one particular 
structure (and this is generally the case for "one-off' civil engineering structures), :R may 
also be interpreted as a measure of the reliability of that particular structure. 
3.2. Bayesian Reliability 
This interpretation of reliability is fundamentally different from that given above, because, 
although the structure may be sampled at random from the theoretically infinite population 
described by the random variable R, once the particular structure has been selected (and, 
in practice, constructed) the reliability becomes the probability that the fixed, but unknown, 
resistance r will be exceeded by the as yet "un-sampled" reference period extreme load 
effect S. The numerical value of the failure probability remains the same but is now 
dependent upon two radically different types of uncertainty - firstly, the physical variability 
of the extreme load effect, and, secondly, lack of knowledge about the true value of the 
fixed but unknown resistance. This type of probability does not have a relative frequency 
interpretation and is commonly called a subjective probability. The associated reliability 
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can be called subjective or Bayesian reliability. For a particular structure, the numerical 
value of this reliability changes as the state of knowledge about the structure changes - for 
example, if non-destructive tests were to be carried out on the structure to estimate the 
magnitude of r. In the limit when r becomes known exactly, the probability of failure given 
by equation (2) changes 
P, = P(r- S ~ 0) = 1- F8 (r) (4) 
This special case may also be interpreted as a conditional failure probability with a relative 
frequency interpretation, i.e. 
P, = P(R- S ~ oJR = r) (5) 
The symbol I may be read as "given that". 
3.3 Methods of Safety Checking 
Methods of structural reliability analysis can be divided into two broad classes. These are: . 
Level 3: methods in which calculations are made to determine the "exact" probability of 
failure for a structure or structural component, making use of a full probabilistic description 
of the joint occurrence of the various quantities which affect the response of the structure 
and taking into account the true nature of the failure domain. 
Level 2: methods involving certain approximate iterative calculation procedures to obtain 
an approximation to the failure probability of a structure or structural system, generally 
requiring an idealisation of failure domain and often associated with a simplified 
representation of the joint probability distribution of the variables. 
In theory, both level 3 and level 2 methods can be used for checking the safety of a design 
or directly in the design process, provided a target reliability or reliability index has been 
specified. 
For the sake of completeness, some mention should also be made of level 1 methods at 
this stage. These are not methods of reliability analysis, but are methods of design or 
safety checking. 
Level 1: design methods in which appropriate degrees of structural reliability are provided 
on a structural element basis (occasionally on a structural basis) by the use of a number of 
partial safety factors, or partial coefficients, related to pre-defined characteristic or nominal 
values of the major structural and loading variables. A level 1 structural design, with the 
explicit consideration of a number of separate limit states, is what is now commonly called 
limit-state design. 
The three levels of safety checking should be seen as a hierarchy of methods in which 
level 2 methods are an approximation to level 3 methods and in which level 1 methods are 
a discretisation of level 2 methods (i.e. giving identical designs to level 2 methods for only 
a few discrete sets of values of the structural design parameters). 
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4. Application to Structural Code 
4.1. Introduction 
Structural codes are documents, which, are subject to periodic revision and amendment, 
but the 1970 - 2000 was a time of marked activity in code development. This is still 
continuing. The main features have been 
• the replacement of many simple design rules by more scientifically-based 
calculations derived from experimental and theoretical research, 
• the move towards limit state design - whereby the designer and/or code writer 
specifies the relevant performance requirements (limit states) for each structure 
explicitly; and where separate sets of calculations are required to check that the 
structure will not attain each limit state (at a given level of probability), 
• the replacement of single safety factors or load factors by sets of partial coefficients, 
• the improvement of rules for the treatment of combinations of loads and other 
actions, 
• the use of structural reliability theory in determining rational sets of partial 
coefficients, and 
• the preparation of model codes for different types of structural materials and forms 
of construction; and steps towards international code harmonisation, particularly 
within the EC. 
In comparison with the idealised models used for calculation purposed, the actual 
. behaviour of most structures is extremely complex and there is a tendency, as more 
research is undertaken and more becomes known, for the design procedures set out in 
structurat codes to become increasingly lengthy and involved. Such changes generally 
increase design costs and increase the risk of major errors being made. They cannot be 
classed as improvements unless the new procedures result in improved standards of 
safety and/or reduced costs of construction and maintenance. 
lt is therefore clear that the "best" codes are not necessarily those with the most 
scientifically advanced design clauses. There may often be advantages in using simplified 
design rules. The effect of this will be to make the overall construction slightly less 
economic and the reliability of those structures designed to the code marginally more 
variable, for any specified standard of reliability. 
4.2. Level 1 Codes 
Level 1 design methods can be described as "design methods in which appropriate 
degrees of structural reliability are provided on a structural element basis (occasionally on 
a structural basis) by the use of a number of partial safety factors (partial coefficients) 
related to pre-defined characteristic or nominal values of the major structural and loading 
variables". A level 1 code is therefore a conventional deterministic code in which the 
nominal strengths of the structural members designed to that code are governed by a 
number of partial coefficients or by equivalent means. 
The safety and serviceability of practical structures are achieved by the use of suitable 
partial coefficients in design, together with appropriate control measures. Both are 
essential and it is helpful to distinguish their individual roles. 
Let us first examine the role of partial coefficients. Consider a structure subjected to a 
random time-varying load Q having a specified nominal magnitude qsp· The structure is 
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proportioned to carry a design load Qd = r Qqsp , where r Q is a partial coefficient on live 
load. The effects of increasing rQ by, say, 20% will in general be 
• an increase in the nominal capacity of the structure to support the load Q 
• an increase in the actual capacity of the structure to support the load Q, 
• an increase in the sizes of the structural members and the self-weight of the 
structure 
• an increase in the cost of the structural system 
• some increase in the actual capacity of the structure to resist any other load Q ' 
• an increase in the safety of the structure as characterised by a reduction in the 
probability that it will fail in any given reference period T . 
If the design strength of a materials is given by ed = esp I r m, where esp is the specified 
material strength and r m is a partial coefficient, an increase in r m will in general have the 
same effects as an increase in r Q. 
There are some circumstances, however, when increases in r Q or in r m may not give rise 
to these effects. For example, the actual load-carrying capacity of a structural member, as 
opposed to its nominal capacity, may decrease or may not significantly increase, if, for 
example, any change in r Q or r m results in the designer using larger diameter reinforcing 
bars which, in spite of having the same specified yield stress as the bars they are 
replacing, may have a lower mean yield stress. Similarly, small changes in YQ or r m may 
I 
sometimes have no effect on either the dimensions or the safety of some structural 
members. This is because of the discrete nature of many structural components (e.g. 
rolled steel beams) and the need to round up to the next section size above when 
designing. In such cases the actual strength, and hence the reliability, is not a continuous 
function of the partial coefficients. 
We now consider the reasons for using partial coefficients as opposed to single safety 
factors or load factors. The main reason is that only by using partial coefficients can 
reasonably consistent standards of reliability be achieved over a range of different designs 
within any one code. The most consistent standards can be achieved by associating a 
partial coefficient or some other safety element with each major source of uncertainty (i.e. 
with each basic variable). Partial coefficients are also essential for the rational treatment of 
load combinations, and in particular for situations in which the total load effect in part of a 
structure is the difference of two load effects of approximately similar magnitude but 
originating from different load sources - e.g. the effects of gravity loads and wind loads in 
the up-wind columns of a tall building. 
4.3. Control Measures 
The safety and serviceability of a structure are influenced as much, if not more, by the 
nature of the control measures that are in operation as by the magnitude of the partial 
coefficients that are used in design. Control takes two main forms 
• quality control of materials and fabrication, and 
• controls to avoid the occurrence of major gross errors in the design and 
construction processes. 
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Control of the first type is aimed at reducing variability in the mechanical properties of 
structural materials and maintaining appropriate mean properties. For example, the 
variability in the yield stress of steel can be reduced by improved control on chemical 
composition and rolling conditions. Such control will, in general, reduce the probabjljty of 
structural failure and thus increase safety. Both the form and the parameters of the 
probabilistic models for resistance variables are dependent on the standards of quality 
control and inspection that are in operation. 
Control of the second type is clearly more difficult to achieve since the sources of possible 
errors are almost unlimited. This is the subject of chapter 5. 
We continue here with the problem of devising a suitable procedure for evaluating partial 
coefficients or other safety elements for a level 1 code. A logical sequence of steps is as 
follows 
• set limits on the range of structures and materials for which the code will be 
applicable, 
• specify the deterministic functional relationships to be used as the basis for each 
design clause, 
• select the general form of the probabilistic models for the various load and 
resistance variables and model uncertainties, 
• specify appropriate quality control measures and acceptance criteria for the 
manufacture and fabrication of basic materials and components, 
• determine the parameters of the relevant models from loading data . and from 
materials data obtained under the specified standards of quality control and 
inspection, 
• select a suitable safety format - the number of partial coefficients and their position 
in the design equations (i.e. the variables associated with partial coefficients), etc., 
• select appropriate representative values of all basic random variables (e.g. 
nominal, characteristic or mean values) to be used as fixed deterministic quantities 
in the code, 
• determine the magnitude of the partial coefficients to be used in conjunction with 
the above representative values to achieve the required standards of reliability. 
Procedures such as this have already been used in the application of structural reliability 
theory to practical level 1 codes. Some of these steps have already been considered in 
some detail, e.g. the modelling of load and resistance variables, and others, e.g. quality 
control procedures, are beyond the scope of this presentation. In the remainder of this 
chapter we shall concentrate on the question of choosing suitable safety formats for 
structural codes and on the calculation of partial coefficients. 
4.4. Safety Formats for Level 1 Codes 
The safety format of a code is defined as the way in which the various clauses of the code 
regulate the degree of safety, or more generally the reliability, of structures designed to the 
code. In particular, it concerns: the number of partial coefficients or other safety elements 
to be used, their positions in the design equations, and rules for load combinations. 
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4.4.1. Limit state functions and checking equations 
The general conditions for a limit state not to be exceeded may be expressed as 
(6) 
where X are the n basic random variables which influence the limit state, and f is the limit 
state function (failure function). The variables X may be sub-divided into variable loads 
- - - -
and actions Q , permanent loads G , material properties E , geometrical parameters D , 
and model uncertainties Xm In addition; each limit state function is likely to involve one or 
more constants c. Equation (13.1) may therefore be re-written as 
f( Q , G, E, D , X m , c) > 0 (7) 
For the purposes of a level 1 code, the equivalent deterministic criterion for safety 
checking (i.e. checking the sufficiency of a structure or structural member whose design 
properties are given) is 
(a) 
where f is the same limit state function as above, involving n quantities xd , and m 
constants c, and qd is the deterministic design value of the random variable Q, etc. 
For many structures it is possible to re-write (7) as 
(9) 
where r represents a resistance function and R = r(·), s represents a load effect or 
action effect function and S = s(·) . XR is a model uncertainty associated with the 
particular form of the resistance function, Xs a model uncertainty associated with the 
particular form of the load effect or action effect function, and where DR and D5 are sets of 
different dimensions. 
In equation (9) the resistance function r and the load effect function s are shown as 
uncoupled; and because they share no common variables the two terms are also 
statistically independent. If such uncoupling is possible, then the deterministic checking 
equation corresponding to equation (8) may be expressed as 
1 --- ----
-XRdr(ed,dRd•c)- YsXsds(qd,gd,dsd•c) > 0 
YR 
(1 0) 
where YR is a partial coefficient on the computed resistance, rs is a partial coefficient on 
the computed load effect, and where the subscript d denotes the design value of the 
variable. 
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Equation (10) is the most general form of the checking equation for a structure in which R 
and S can be uncoupled. In this case, the safety or serviceability of a structure can clearly 
be increased or decreased by adjusting any or all of the (n - 1) independent design values 
- - -
xd (e.g. qd or ed) and the two partial coefficients YR and rs. Substituting these values 
into equation (1 0) gives the required value of the remaining quantity - general1y a 
dimension. Because there is an infinite number of sets of (n - 1) values xd which will give 
the same design, the problem facing the code writer is to select the "best" set of values 
xd. 
lt should be noted that in practice the quantities R and S may often be correlated because 
of common parameters. For example, the self-weight of a reinforced concrete beam and 
hence the mid-span bending moment Swill be weakly correlated with the beam's moment-
carrying capacity R, as both are functions of beam depth. 
4.4.2. Characteristic values of basic variables 
The term characteristic value was introduced in the late 1950's at the time when 
probabilistic concepts were first being introduced into structural codes; and when it was 
recognised that few basic variables have clearly defined upper or lower limits that can 
sensibly be used in design. Characteristic values of actions and material properties bas~d 
on a prescribed probability p of not being exceeded were considered to be more rational 
than arbitrary selected values. 
The characteristic value xk of a basic random variable X is defined as the pth tractile of X 
given by ' 
(11) 
where F; 1 is the inverse distribution function of X, and p a probability which depends on 
the type of variable being considered (i.e. a load or a strength). 
The selection of the probability p is to a large extent arbitrary but is influenced by the 
following considerations 
• characteristic values of loads and other actions are values which should rarely be 
exceeded, 
• characteristic values of material strength properties should normally be exceeded 
by actual properties, 
• the values of p should neither be so large nor so small that the values Xk are not 
occasionally encountered, 
• it is often sensible to use previously adopted nominal values as specified 
characteristic values, Xsp· 
The distinction between characteristic value and specified characteristic value (specified 
value) should be made clear. The former is a tractile of a random variable, whereas the 
latter is some specified single value of the same quantity - a constant. For practical 
reasons it is generally necessary for the user of a level 1 code to work with specified 
values of all the design variables rather than with actual characteristic values, some of 
which will not be known at the design stage. For example, the actual characteristic value of 
the 28-day cube or cylinder strength of concrete is likely to depend on the particular 
16 
supplier or contractor and is not known in advance. In this case it is necessary for the 
quality control procedures specified by the code writers to be such that the actual 
characteristic strength of the material exceeds the specified strength by an appropriate 
margin or with a stated probability. Similarly, the user of a code should normally work with 
specified deterministic values of loads and other actions; it is the responsibility of the code 
writers to relate these values to the distributions of the actual loads and actions, ana to 
recommend associated partial coefficients or other safety elements. 
4.4.3. Treatment of geometrical variables 
Geometrical variables are of two main types - structural dimensions (e.g. the depth of a 
beam) and geometrical imperfections (e.g. the out-of-straightness of a column). 
Structural dimensions: The uncertainties in most structural dimensions D are generally 
small and for this reason the mean value flo may be taken as the characteristic value (i .e. 
dk = JL0 ) . 
Geometrical imperfections: The strength of many structural members, for example most 
plates, columns and shell structures, depends not only on cross-sectional and overall 
dimensions but also on the magnitude of relevant geometrical imperfections I. 
For such structures it is normal to specify an upper limit & on the imperfection magnitude, 
i.e. 0::; I::; & . In this case, & can be taken as the specified characteristic value of I, lsp. 
The probability that fsp will be exceeded will generally be small and will depend on the 
standard of inspection. The actual characteristic value of the imperfection ik can 
conveniently be chosen as the 95% tractile of I and the acceptance criteria designed so 
that lsp exceeds ik by an appropriate margin (or with a stated probability). 
Design values of dimensions and imperfections: Typically, the standard deviations of 
geometrical variables are independent of nominal dimensions (e.g. for given site 
conditions, the standard deviation in the thickness of a 1 00 mm slab is likely to be about 
the same as that of a 200 mm slab; giving a reduction in the coefficient of variation for 
increasing nominal thickness). For this reason the most uniform standards of reliability can 
be obtained over a range of different structures by using design values dd and id of the 
geometrical variables related to the specified values, as follows dd = dsp ± 11d and 
id = isp ± t:, i where t:,d and t:,i are additive safety elements. 
For many structures, however, the probability of failure is insensitive to small variations in 
structural dimensions. For these cases, t:,d and t:,i should be set to zero and the 
uncertainties in D and I should be allowed for by modifications to the partial coefficients on 
the other design variables. 
4.4.4. Treatment of material properties 
We shall restrict our attention to the strength properties of structural materials, denoted E. 
For each variable, the characteristic value ek should be such that it has a reasonably high 
probability q (= 1 - p) of being exceeded in any single trial or test. Typically, q is taken to 
be between 0.95 and 0.99, corresponding to the 5% and 1% tractile of the variable E. 
However, the user of a level 1 code may often not know the actual characteristic values for 
his material properties in advance, and it is generally necessary to design using specified 
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characteristic values, esp· The acceptance criteria for a material should be devised so that 
ek exceeds esp at a stated level of probability Pe· 
The design value ed of the strength of a material is obtained from the specified or 
characteristic strength as follows ed = esp I r m where r m is a partial coefficient on stren_gth. 
4.4.5 Treatment of loads and other actions 
Most loads differ from other basic variables in that they vary significantly with time and are 
generally not amenable to effective control. There are some notable exceptions to both 
these generalisations. Because of the time-varying nature of most loads, the problem of 
assessing the combined effect of a number of different loads acting on a structure has 
arise. As might be expected a rather similar problem arises in treating combined loads 
within the framework of a deterministic level 1 code. 
Characteristic values: The uncertainty in most permanent loads is small and for this 
reason it is customary to use the mean or nominal values of permanent loads in most 
design calculations. For the same reason it is appropriate that the characteristic value gk of 
each permanent load G is taken as its mean value JiG . JiG may be considered by using 
mean dimensions and mean densities. 
For a time-varying load Q, the characteristic value qk is normally defined as that value 
which has a prescribed probability p of not being exceeded within a given reference 
period. lt is therefore the p1h tractile of the extreme value distribution of the load 
corresponding to that reference period. The nominal loads specified in most loading codes 
vary rather widely in terms of their probability of exceedance. 
Single time-varying loads: If a structure or structural component is subjected to only 
permanent loads G and one time-varying load Q, the load-combination problem does not 
arise. In this case, the values gd and qd to be used in the design or safety checking 
process are obtained from gd = r,Ggk and qd = r roqk where r tG and r ro are partial 
coefficients and gk and qk are characteristic values of the random variables G and Q, 
respectively. 
For failure modes in which part of the permanent load acts in a stabilising or resisting 
sense and part in a de-stabilising or loading sense, different values of r tG should be used 
for the two components; YrG ::; 1 when the load is stabilising the structure YrG ::::: 1 when it 
is not. 
Combinations of time-varying loads: When a structure has to resist a number of 
stochastically independent time-varying loads, it is clear that the probability of two or more 
loads exceeding their characteristic values simultaneously is small. If the total load effect 
in a member were to be determined from the characteristic values of the individual loads 
multiplied by the corresponding partial coefficients then the resulting load effect S would 
be extremely conservative. For this reason it is necessary to introduce a set of reduction 
factors lf/o; ( lfo; ::; 1) to be applied to the time-varying loads Q; to take account of the 
reduced probability of the design values of the loads being exceeded simultaneously. 
In principle, if there are n time-varying loads, it is necessary to undertake n design checks 
(equation (13.6)) on the structure, using a separate set of lfo factors for each check and 
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with lf/oj = 1 for the r check. The need for a number of design checks using different sets 
of lf/o factors arises from the fact that throughout a structure the contribution of each 
separate load Qi to the maximum load-effect in any member varies considerably from 
member to member. For example, although snow loading may dominate the load ef(ect in 
the roof beams of a multi-storey building, the same loads have only a small influenc-e on 
the total load effects in the ground floor columns. In practice, with detailed knowledge of 
the structure being designed or checked, it is often possible to reduce the number of 
checks significantly. 
4.5. Methods for Evaluation of Partial Coefficients 
4.5.1. Introduction 
The design clauses given in level 1 codes should be interpreted as a set of decision rules, 
the outcome of which can be modified by changes to a set of control parameters - the 
partial coefficients. The process of selecting the set of partial coefficients to be used in a 
particular code should be seen as a process of optimisation such that the outcome of all 
designs undertaken to the code is in some sense optimal. Whether or not a formal 
optimisation is undertaken in practice, it is useful to think of the partial coefficient selection 
process in this way. lt is then clear that the possibility exists for using any simplified set of 
design clauses together with a modified set of partial coefficients, which on average will 
achieve the same degree of safety as the more complex set. The penalty to be paid for 
using the simplified design rules is some increase in materials usage. 
· In Thoft-Christensen & Baker (1982) is detailed shown a general method for evaluation of 
partial coefficients. Practical codes should have the smallest number of partial coefficients 
that is consistent with reasonably uniform standards of reliability; moreover, the same 
partial coefficients should be applicable to a wide range of structural components. This 
means that they must be applicable without being unsafe or unduly conservative. 
4.5.2. A General Method for Code Calibration 
A suitable general method for the evaluation of a set of partial coefficients is now 
presented. The first stage of this process is to decide upon an appropriate standard of 
reliability or target failure probability for the structures (or more generally, structural 
components, e.g. beams, columns, slabs) that will be designed using the new code. 
Studies of the reliability of structural components designed to traditional codes typically 
show very wide ranges of reliability. An appropriate choice for the target failure probability 
Ptt for a new code is the weighted average of the failure probabilities exhibited by 
components designed to existing codes, provided that the least reliable component 
exhibited satisfactory performance in actual service. The latter is not always easy to verify 
because existing codes may not have been in use for a sufficiently long period of time and 
structures may have been subjected to only a fraction of their design loads. The 
weighting factors w; i should be selected to represent the previous frequency of usage of 
each structural component included in the calibration and should be such that 'Lw; = 1. 
i 
Use of the weighted average failure probability rather than, say, the weighted average 
reliability index means that the target failure probability Ptt tends to be governed by the 
less reliable components in existing codes. This assumed a measure of economy in the 
new code, but care has to be taken that these reliabilities are not too low. A more direct 
approach to the choice of target failure probabilities has been recommended by the Nordic 
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Committee on Building Regulations (NKB) In this, the target failure probability depends on 
the consequences of failure and on the nature of the failure mode, as shown in table 2. 
Failure Failure type Failure type Failure type 
consequences I 11 Ill 
Not serious 1 o-.j 3.09 10-4 3.71 1 o-o 4.26 
Serious 10-4 3.71 1 o-b 4.26 1 o-o 4.75 
Very serious 1 o-o 4.26 1 o-o 4.75 1 o-r 5.20 . . 
Table 2. Target fatlure probabilities and corresponding reltabtlify mdtces . 
The target failure probabilities given in table 2 are for a reference period of 1 year, but 
should be treated as operational or notional probabilities and not as relative frequencies. 
The failure types are defined as: 
I ductile failure with reserve strength capacity resulting from strain hardening 
11 ductile failure with no reserve capacity 
Ill brittle failure and instability 
Having chosen a target failure probability, the problem of selecting a set of partial 
coefficients r for a code, or part of a code, may now be reduced to the following 
optimisation problem 
m -
miDS = mjn L:mil1(Pti(y),Pti) 
r / i=I 
m _ m (12) 
s.t. L:miPfi(r) = Pft , L:mi = 1.0 
i=l i=l 
where L1(P,/y),Pfi) is an agreed function of P,/r) (the failure probability of the i1h structural 
-
component designed using the set of partial coefficients r) and Pft (the target failure 
probability), and m= (mp···mm) (the set of weighting factors indicating the relative 
importance of each of the m structural components included in the partial factor 
evaluation). 
In general terms, the aim of this approach is to minimise the deviations of the probabilities 
Pn from the target probability of failure Ptt, whilst maintaining the average probability of 
failure at the target level. Experience has shown that the values of the partial coefficients 
are generally very insensitive to the form of the objective function used in equation (12). A 
suitable function is: 
m -
S = L:mi(pi(r)- flt) 2 (13) 
i=l 
where fJ is the reliability index. 
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5. Gross Errors and Quality Assurance 
5.1. Introduction 
In undertaking a reliability analysis, the engineer should take account of all known sources 
of uncertainty and should use this information to control the probabilities of structural 
failure and unserviceability within acceptable ranges. This can be done either directly, by 
modifying some part of the structure, or indirectly by modifying the partial coefficients. 
Allowance should be made for the possibility of the occurrence of all recognised failure 
modes, e.g. shear, buckling, plastic collapse, etc., together with various modes of 
unserviceability. 
lt is widely recognised, however, that most structural failures occur for unexpected reasons 
and in ways that have not previously been encountered. No discussion of structural 
reliability theory is therefore complete without some consideration being given to these 
additional causes of failure and their possible treatment. 
5.2. Gross Errors 
In the preceding chapters probabilistic modelling of loads and resistance variables is 
discussed. These models are selected or devised in such a way as to embody those 
features of the physical quantity that are essential for the analysis of the practical problems 
being considere_d. it should not be thought that the models are intended to be a perfect 
mirror image of reality, but rather as a "tool" in a decision making process. Depending on 
the nature of the decision to be taken, the "tool" may need to be changed. For example, in 
_ modelling the yield stress of steel, a simple lognormal distribution may often be used (see 
chapter 3), but on other occasions a mixed distribution model would be more appropriate. 
One important assumption that has been made is that the probabilistic models for loads 
and resistance variables are representative of events during a particular period of time -
the life of the structure in the case of loads and other actions, and the period of 
construction in the case of material properties. In fact, the models are conditional upon or 
pre-suppose certain standards of design checking, quality control, inspection and 
maintenance. If, for example, the standards of quality control used in the manufacture of a 
structural material change,- one would expect to see some change in the probability 
distribution function of that variable. If the standards of quality control are significantly 
different between different manufacturers or suppliers (e.g. in the case of steel or 
concrete), it may be convenient to use a mixed distribution model to allow for these 
differences. 
The problems that need to be considered here, however, are of a different nature. The 
vast majority of structural failures occur because of gross errors. A gross error is defined 
as a major or fundamental mistake in some aspect of the processes of planning, design, 
analysis, construction, use or maintenance of a structure that has the potential for causing 
failure. Gross errors occur because of inadequacies in the standards of quality assurance -
the process by which the various components of complete "building process" (mentioned 
above) are co-ordinated with the aim of achieving the design objective. lt should be noted, 
however, that not all gross errors make as structure weaker - they can also make it 
unnecessarily strong. Typical examples of gross errors are mistaken in design 
calculations, use of the wrong size of reinforcing bars or grade of steel, misinterpretations 
of geotechnical survey data, subjecting the structure to a class of loading for which it was 
not intended, etc. 
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A gross error should not therefore be considered as some extreme value in the tail of the 
probability distribution used to model a particular random variable, but a discrete event G 
that radically alters the probability of failure by changing the models that are applicable. 
Example 3. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that a structure has a resistanc_e R 
which is dependent on only one basic variable, the yield stress of steel, and that it is 
subjected to a single load effect S. For simplicity, let R and S be normally 
distributed with 
f-LR = 380 NI mm2 ; O" R = 25 NI mm2 
J.Ls =230Nimm2 ; O"s =43Nimm2 
Then it can easily be shown that ,8 = 3.02and P, = 1.3 x 10-3 • Assume now that a 
lower grade of steel is used in place of the correct grade, so that R is distributed 
with parameters f-LR'= 280 NI mm2 and O"R'= 25 NI mm2 giving ,8'= 1.00 and 
P,=0.16. 
The values of f-LR and f-LR given above are typical for the yield stress of grade 50 
and 43 weld able structural steels, and it can therefore be seen that a gross error 
involving the substitution of grade 43 steel for grade 50 in a critical part of a 
structure is quite likely to cause failure - a chance of about 1 in 6 with the arbitrary 
assumptions made here. 
-The preceding example is somewhat simplistic and little attention should be paid to the 
actual numbers used. However, it illustrates the principle that the models, which are used 
under nor
1
mal conditions, without the presence of gross errors, are no longer applicable 
when a gross error occurs. This does not mean that reliability theory cannot be used under 
these conditions- it means that the models have to be amended. The problem is to know 
the various forms, which gross errors can take. 
5.3. Classification of gross errors 
Table 3 gives a general classification of the nature and sources of gross errors, along with 
some examples. No such list can, of course, be comprehensive. Indeed, by their very 
nature, some potential gross errors or hazardous situations must exist which have not yet 
been recognised. Ignorance of phenomena such as fatigue, brittle fracture and the 
deterioration of concrete made from high-alumina cement are typical examples from the 
past of errors in design concept. Early designers cannot be criticised for not knowing about 
such effects, just as there is no reason to suppose that currently unrecognised failure 
modes will not cause accidents in the future. 
Those gross errors, which cause structural collapse or unserviceability, can also be 
classified according to the type of failure that occurs, as shown in table 4. The word failure, 
here, should be interpreted in the general sense of failure to comply with some 
performance requirement and not just collapse (i.e. it includes unserviceability). Two types 
are given: those in which the structure fails in a predictable manner by one of a number of 
foreseen failure modes - here called type A; and those in which unforeseen failure modes 
occur- called type B. 
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Source Nature Example 
Design - Possible failure mode unrecognised - neglect of lateral torsional buckling 
concept - Incorrect nature of use assumed - room used for storage of heavy equipment in 
office premises 
Design - Omission of a load or load - effect of ground-water pressure overlooked. 
and combination . 
analysis - Misinterpretation of geotechnical - soft stratum not detected 
Data 
- Computational error in analysis - error in computer program 
- Misinterpretation of units - kilogram's interpreted as Newtons 
- Error in detailing - 20 mm bars used instead of 40 mm bars 
Construe- - Misinterpretation of drawings - 1 OOmm slab instead of 150 mm slab 
tion - Use of incorrect material - grade 43 steel used instead of grade 50 steel 
- Incorrect farication - omission of heat treatment 
- Incorrect construction - error in position of reinforcement 
Inspection - Gross defect not detected - crack in weld 
Use - Accidental loading - severe impact or explosion 
- Change of use without structural - domestic premises used for public library 
assessment 
- Need for specialist maintenance - cathodic protection system becomes 
overlooked inoperative 
Table 3. General Classification of the nature and sources of gross errors. 
Type of failure Gross errors 
Type A: Errors affecting: 
Failure in a mode of - load-carrying capacity 
behaviour against - ability to remain serviceable 
which the structure - applied load(s) 
was designed 
Type B: Errors that relate to the fundamental 
Failure in a mode of understanding of structural behaviour, arising 
behaviour against from: 
which the structure - profession's ignorance 
was not designed - engineers' ignorance 
- engineers' oversight . . 
Table 4. Classiflcatton of gross errors accordmg to type of failure . 
Failures of type A arise because of gross errors in the calculation of design loads and/or 
load-carrying capacities, and/or because of weaknesses, which are introduced into the 
structure during construction. Most of the examples in table 3 are of this type. Failures of 
type 8 occur mainly because of lack of knowledge. However, distinction must be made 
between failures, which are the result of ignorance within the structural engineering 
profession as a whole, and those that occur because of ignorance or negligence by an 
individual or design team. In the latter case, the engineer or team is clearly responsible for 
the failure. In the former, he or they are just unfortunate, unless it can be shown that 
currently accepted practice has been extrapolated to an unreasonable extent. 
The prevention of failures, which arise from lack of knowledge within the profession, as a 
whole is clearly impossible and occasional failures of this type, will continue to occur. They 
will then be researched and this will add to the general fund of engineering knowledge. 
Failures of type A, and failures of type 8 resulting from an engineer's ignorance or 
negligence, are in theory preventable, but this requires an appropriate level of expenditure 
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on education, training, design checking, quality control, inspection, maintenance, etc. The 
planning and coordination of these various tasks is the subject of quality assurance. 
Tables 3 and 4 show only two of many possible ways of classifying gross errors. For 
instance, errors can be classified according to: 
- nature of the error (table 3) 
-type of failure associated with the error (table 4) 
- consequences of failure arising from the error 
- those responsible for causing the error 
-etc. 
%of total 
60 
A. Lack of formal qualifications 
B. Lack of education 
40 
C. Lack of experience 
D. Lack of ability to communicate 
E. Lack of authority 
F. Incompetence 
20 
G. Negligence 
H. Sharp practice 
.{\BCDEFGH 
Figure 2. Analysis of underlying causes of structural failures in buildings, from Thoft-
Christensen & Baker (1982). 
Considerable success has been achieved in the analysis of structural failure data using 
this type of classification. An important conclusion is that many gross errors occur because 
of lack of experience on the part of those undertaking the work and because the 
fundamental behaviour of the structure is often not fully understood. Figure 2 illustrates 
this point in a study of 120 building failures, it was found that over 60% were due to lack of 
experience by the personnel concerned and that in about 50% of all cases the major 
cause of failure was a lack of appreciation of the relevant design concepts - for example, 
ignorance of the need to design against lateral torsional buckling in unsupported 
compression flanges. Such findings are of considerable value in the planning of quality 
assurance schemes, but this will not be discussed here. 
5.3. Quality Assurance 
5.3.1. Introduction 
The phrase "building process" has been used in the preceding sections as a general term 
to include planning, design, analysis, construction, maintenance and use of a structure. lt 
will also be used here, to cover all aspects and stages of a structural development, but it 
should be emphasized that it is applicable to all structural projects, not just buildings. 
For a given structure and location, the building process can be divided into two distinct 
stages: 
1) preparing a precise deterministic specification for the structure, and 
2) building the structure and checking that the specification is met. 
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~' . 
The specification, involving documents and drawings, will typically contain information of 
the type: 
- the column shall contain 16 reinforcing bars of diameter 40 mm 
- the nominal thickness of the slab shall be 200 mm 
- the structural steel shall have a nominal yield stress of 350 n/mmA2 
-etc. 
This information, which i passed from the designer to the contractor (or builder), is and 
needs to be of a deterministic nature. The second part of the building process involves the 
transformation of the specification into physical reality - the structure - and checking that it 
is satisfactory. 
For new structures, the role played by reliability theory is in the preparation of the 
structural specification, either directly, by subjecting the proposed design to a reliability 
analysis or, indirectly, by using a code in which the partial coefficients have been assessed 
probabilistically. As previously mentioned (for example in chapter 3), the probabilistic 
models used in reliability analysis are conditional upon the specified standards of quality 
control and acceptance tests for the materials, and on the standards of inspection for the 
finished structure. Stages 1) and 2) of the building process are (or should be) intimately 
related. The role of quality assurance, in its broadest sense, is to coordinate, rationalise 
and monitor these two stages. 
Reliability theory also has a role to play in the assessment of existing structures, 
particularly when structural damage has occurred as a result of accidental loading, or 
when a structure is being assessed for a radical change of use. it should be noted that in 
all cases, the questions to be answered are of the type: Is the structure strong enough? 
Should the nominal dimensions be increased or reduced, and if so by how much? 
5.3.2. The effect of gross errors on the choice of partial coefficients 
The problem that must now be considered is whether knowledge that gross errors can 
occur during the processes of design and construction should affect the rational choice of 
partial coefficients for use in level 1 codes. This is best explored by means of an example. 
Example 4. Take a failure function of the form f(G,R,K,S) = 0 and let the safety 
margin be 
M=GR-KS (14) 
where R is a continuously distributed random strength variable, N(,uRpR), S is a 
continuously distributed random load effect, N( ,u5, CT s ), K is a discrete-valued model 
uncertainty, and G is a gross error which modifies the strength parameter R, and 
assume that the quantities R,S,K and G are statistically independent. This is a 
reasonable assumption, as least as far as independence of G and the other 
variables is concerned, since it may be assumed, for example, that the probability of 
having an incorrect size of reinforcing bars is unrelated to the yield stress of the 
bars or to the loads that are subsequently applied to the structure. 
Let the initial cost of the structure be given by c, = a,uR where alpha is a constant, 
and let the consequential cost of failure , should it occur, be c, = ~c, = ~a,uR . 
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The probability of failure, given a gross error of magnitude g and a model 
uncertainty of magnitude k, may be expressed as P,lg,k = P(gR- kS:::; 0) and the 
expected conditional total cost as E[CT lg, k] = c, + c,P, lg, k . Assuming that the 
model uncertainty K can take the following discrete values with probabilitY' mass 
p(kJ 
kj I 0.4 I 0.5 I 0.6 
p(ki) 0.2 0.6 0.2 
Table 5. 
the expected total cost, given a gross error g, E[CTig], is 
3 
E[CTig]= z)c, + c,P,Ig)p(k) (15) 
i=l 
The expected total cost given that there is a gross error g with a probability p(g), 
and no error (g = 1) with a probability 1 - p(g) is thus 
3 3 
E[CTig}= ~)c, + c,P,Ig)p(k)p(g) + ~)c, + c,P,)p(k)(l- p(g)) (.16) 
i=l i=l 
Substituting for c, and c, from gives 
1 3 3 
E[CTig]= l:a,uR(l + ~P,Ig)p(k)p(g) + l:a,uR(l + ~P,)p(k)(l- p(g)) (17) 
i =l i=l 
.U R,opt(g) increasing gross 
error magnitude 
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Figure 3. 
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Variable JL CJIJL 
R - 0.07 
s 100 0.10 
a =1 0 cost units 
~ =20 
Table 6. 
Let us now undertake an unconstrained minimisation of E[CT(g)] with respect to 
the quantity 1-LR and denote the minimum value of 1-LR by 1-LR,opt(g) . This is shown in 
figure 3 for the set of parameters given in table 6. 
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\\EJCT (g) JI' R c78.65 ) J 
\ I 
EI CT(g) ) ~ R . opt ) ..l \'\, : 
" "'""" I 
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Figure 4. (p(g) = 0.05). 
An important result for this particular set of assumptions is that the quality 
assurance process is able to restrict the frequency of gross errors to less than 2%, 
then 1-LR,opt is very insensitive to the occurrence of gross errors of any magnitude. A 
more important result, however, is that even if the frequency of gross errors rises to 
say 5%, although 1-LR,opt shows a marked increase for gross errors of moderate 
magnitude, the expected total cost given by 
E[CT(g)!JLR,opt] = I(c, + c,P,,Q,Jlopt)P(k)p(g) + I(c, + c,P,,JLR,opt)P(k)(l- p(g)) (18) 
i=l i=l 
is insensitive to the decision of whether or not to allow for the possibility of gross 
errors in calculating 1-LR ,opt (see figure 4). At the worst, the total expected cost differs 
by only 15%. 
This example indicates that, at least for the set of models and parameters chosen, the 
possibility of the occurrence of gross errors should not influence the selection of partial 
coefficients for use in structural design. The extent to which these results can be 
generalized depends on circumstances, but it is considered that under many conditions 
the optimisation of expenditure on the control of gross errors can be undertaken 
independently of the choice of partial coefficients. Probabilistically based structural 
integrity analysis has been used for many years in the nuclear industry. lt started as early 
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as 1980-81 with the computer code PRAISE (Piping Reliability Analysis Including Seismic 
Events) developed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Later it was 
expanded to include stress corrosion cracking initiation and growth to failure. Since then 
more similar codes have been developed. 
The basic principle in these codes is to use the deterministic equations but to apply 
statistical distributions to uncertain quantities. Thereby, instead of giving a single yes or 
no statement to any given failure criterion (the deterministic approach), the probabilistic 
approach provides a probability of that criteria being met. 
Probability of Failure and Fatigue Life Monitoring for Life Extension: In-service monitoring 
of transients may in certain cases be used to remove uncertainties related to operation of 
nuclear plants. From a safety standpoint this will provide a high level of coincidence that 
no unknown could give rise to possible failure. This knowledge means that a more 
accurate assessment of the so-called true ASME fatigue usage factor can be made. In-
service monitoring combined with service inspection is also of great importance in 
questions like life extension of a nuclear plant. 
The respective values of reliability analysis and quality assurance have been explored 
earlier in this chapter and have been show to be entirely compatible. The analysis of many 
structural failures shows that the majority could not have been prevented by minor 
increases in partial coefficients. This is consistent with the results obtained from example 4 
and indicates that relatively more resources should be deployed on control, inspection and 
checking - i.e. quality assurance. A discussion of this large subject is beyond the scope of 
the present text. 
6. Industrial Applications of Structural Reliability Theory 
A number of industrial applications of structural reliability theory are given in Thoft-
Christensen (1997) and Thoft-Christensen (1998). This chapter is based on these two 
references. 
6.1. Nuclear Installations 
This section is based on a paper by Chapman, Pitner & Persoz (1997) where five 
applications of structural reliability in the nuclear industry are presented: 
• Probability of Failure and Fatigue Life Monitoring for Life Extension 
• Maintenance Optimisation and Life Prediction of Steam Generator Tube Bundle 
• ISI (In-Service Inspection) as a Confidence Builder 
• Integrity Analyses of Reactor Pressure Vessel subjected to Transient Conditions 
• Risk Based In-Service Inspection 
Probabilistically based structural integrity analysis has been used for many years in the 
nuclear industry. lt started as early as 1980-81 with the computer code PRAISE (Piping 
Reliability Analysis Including Seismic Events) developed by the United States Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. Later it was expanded to include stress corrosion cracking 
initiation and growth to failure. Since then more similar codes have been developed. 
The basic principle in these codes is to use the deterministic equations but to apply 
statistical distributions to uncertain quantities. Thereby, instead of giving a single yes or 
no statement to any given failure criterion (the deterministic approach), the probabilistic 
approach provides a probability of that criteria being met. 
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Figure 5. Schematic diagram of steps in analysis of reliability of PRAISE code. Taken from 
Chapman, Pitner & Persoz (1997). 
Probability of Failure and Fatigue Life Monitoring for Life Extension: In-service monitoring 
of transients may in certain cases be used to remove uncertainties related to operation of 
nuclear plants. From a safety standpoint this will provide a high level of coincidence that 
no unknown could give rise to possible failure. This knowledge means that a more 
accurate assessment of the so-called true ASME fatigue usage factor can be made. In-
service monitoring combined with service inspection is also of great importance in 
questions like life extension of a nuclear plant. 
Maintenance Optimisation and Life Prediction of Steam Generator Tube Bundle: A serious 
problem for steam generators (SG) in pressurised water reactors (PWR) is degradation of 
their tubes. The main causes are corrosion and defect mechanical mechanisms. 
Therefore, there is a need for a very high degree of reliability. In-service inspections are 
used as a means of detecting and tracking defects before they reach a critical size 
Two main objectives are ascribed to SG tube maintenance: 
• From the standpoint of safety, keeping the probability of a tube rupture at a very low 
level imposed by the design rules. 
• From the standpoint of availability, limiting the number of shutdowns caused by primary-
to-secondary leakages in excess of specifications. 
29 
In Chapman, Pitner & Persoz (1997) two significant advantages using probabilistic fracture 
mechanics to assess the risk of failure of a tube are mentioned: 
• All factors of influence can be taken into account as random variables, rather than using 
pessimistic, conservative, assumptions. 
• The influence of maintenance and inspection on risk of failure can be quantified. 
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Figure 6. Relative influence of the sample size on the risk of tube rupture. Taken from 
Chapman, Pitner & Persoz (1997) 
In Chapman, Pitner & Persoz (1997) a number of interesting issues are investigated. Two 
will be mentioned here. Figure 6 shows the evolution of risks estimated for normal 
operating conditions with different random sample percentages. Note the small difference 
between inspection of one tube in eight (12.5%) and in one tube in two (50%). However, a 
1 00% inspection is very effective at detecting and plugging large critical flaws. Figure 7 
shows t~e degree of conservatism in the evaluation of the safety level when worst case 
values (deterministic approach) are used for the key parameters of the failure analysis. 
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Figure 7. Relative benefit of the probabilistic approach applied to an evaluation of critical 
crack size for normal operating conditions. Taken from Chapman, Pitner & Persoz (1997). 
/SI as a Confidence Builder: In-Service Inspection (ISI) is an essential way of 
demonstrating that an operating plant is safe. Reference Chapman, Pitner & Persoz 
(1997) presents a probability of failure model, which accepts that input parameters are not 
precisely defined. In the model these dates are considered unknown and the object of the 
ISI data is to obtain information about them. 
Integrity Analyses of Reactor Pressure Vessel subjected to Transient Conditions: The 
reactor pressure vessel is of major importance for the safety of a PWR nuclear plant. 
Therefore, the integrity of this structure must be guaranteed, even in the case of the most 
severe accidents. Further its mechanical state can be decisive for the lifetime of the plant. 
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The vessel wall is one of the most affected zones by embrittlement due to neutron 
radiation damage. In reference Chapman, Pitner & Persoz (1997) a probabilistic fracture 
mechanics model is described which can be used to: 
• estimate the likelihood of vessel failure and perform sensitivity studies, 
• identify the relative influence of key input parameters, 
• assess the effect of conservatism introduced in deterministic analysis, 
• help to define acceptability in-service criteria. 
Risk Based In-Service Inspection. In reference Chapman, Pitner & Persoz (1997) the 
application of software for structural reliability risk assessment developed by Rolls-Royce 
& Associated Ltd., UK, is described. As an example the application on vessel welds is 
shown in figure 8. The probability of failure per year of a vessel is approximately 2.2*1 o-8 
and is dominated by a circumferential weld. However, including the smaller details of the 
condensate increase this very low probability of failure to 2.5*1 o-6. The results of these 
assessments show that the probability of failure depends significantly on the vessel 
details. 
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Figure 8. Evaluation of the probability of failure for vessel welds. Taken from Chapman, 
Pitner & Persoz (1997) . 
6.2. Offshore - Pipeline Free Span Design 
This section is based on Hagen & M0rk (1997). Offshore sub sea pipelines are often 
installed in areas of irregular seabed topography and in deep water. Therefore, free spans 
in such pipeline systems may occur and submarine currents or wave induced flow 
velocities may cause significant dynamic excitation of the free span sections. Further, 
amplified response due to resonant fluid-structure interaction may cause fatigue damage. 
In 1994 the joint industry R&D MUL TISPAN project was established by a number of 
companies and institutions to provide rational criteria for free spans. Appropriate target 
safety levels are fundamental to the process of developing new design criteria through the 
application of reliability methods. In the DNV design rules from 1996 the target safety 
levels shown in table 7 are recommended. 
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Limit Stale Probability Bases Safely Cln!iSC!i 
Guogory Low Nomml High 
Serviceability Annual per Pipeline•> to·' w·' 10"' 
Ultima1..:: Annual per Pipcline 11 w·' to-' · I Q-' 
Fatigue Lifetime probabilily per [ljpclinc.21 to·' 10~ 10' --- 'Jo:o Accidcmal Annual per kmJ1 10"' w-~ 
l Or the length of the pcnod m tJn: temporary ph;ue 
2 No inspecflon and r~i r is .auumed , tcm(lorary ntld in·Scl'\'tcc conditions considcrr.d rogflher. 
---=~ Rcfm~o~: ovc rnllnllow~l_:p~~b!!!_~r.~r~~~~~~:~~c~-'- - ··- - ---- _ __ _ 
Table 7. Recommended target safety levels in ONV'96. Taken from Hagen & M0rk (1997) . 
In the ONV'96 rules for submarine pipeline systems new safety classes are defined by: 
• Low Safety Class, where failure implies no risk of human injury and minor 
environmental and economic consequences. 
• Normal Safety Class, i.e. normal classification. 
• High safety Class, where failure implies risk of human injury, significant environmental 
pollution or very high economic or political consequences. 
A detailed presentation of a reliability based calibration study is given in reference Hagen 
& M0rk (1997). One result of the calibration study is shown in figure 9. The five lines in 
figure 9 correspond to five design cases for the annual extreme current distribution and, 
the stars indicate proposed safety factors for annual probability of failure for the three 
safety classes. 
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Figure 9. Onset criteria for cross-flow V/V. Calibration study for base case. Taken from 
Hagen & M0rk (1997). 
In reference Hagen & M0rk (1997) significant cross-flow vortex induced vibrations are 
defined as maximum oscillation amplitudes larger than 0.1 0, where 0 is the diameter of 
the pipe. For the steady current case the cross-flow no-vibration criterion is given as: 
u 
foe~ n,c YT'¥D'¥R'¥u 
. V R,onset D 
Safety Low Normal High 
Class temporary in-service in-service 
rr 1.7 2.0 2.3 
Table 8. Recommended safety factors. Taken from Hagen & M0rk (1997). 
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where r r is a safety factor given in table 8 and where the other quantities are defined in 
Hagen & M0rk (1997). 
The work presented above is presently being extended to cover fatigue analysis and 
onset-criteria for combined wave and current induced loads for unevenness induced and 
scour induced free spans. · 
6.3. Requalification of Jacket Structure 
This section is based on Sigurdsson, Cramer & Hagen (1997) . The objective of a 
requalification is to establish: 
• that the structure is fit for its intended purpose over the residual service life, 
• that the consequences in terms of risk to human life, to the environment and to the 
assets, in the event of structural failure, are acceptable from both a reliability and an 
economical point of view. 
Some typical initiators for requalification are mentioned in reference Sigurdsson, Cramer & 
Hagen (1997): 
• repair of damage or excessive deterioration, 
• extension of service life, 
• new rules and regulations, 
• new load and strength models, 
• new analysis and calculation methods, 
• . significant changes in the consequence of failure, 
• discovery of design or construction errors, 
• doubts about the safety of the structure/facility for any other reasons, 
• detailed planning of I&M. 
Figure 10. Offshore jacket structure. Taken from Sigurdsson, Cramer & Hagen (1997). 
The requalification procedure presented in reference Sigurdsson, Cramer & Hagen (1997) 
is illustrated for the jacket structure shown in figure 1 0. The jacket was designed in the 
sixties on the basis of data, which have been changed later. In reference Sigurdsson, 
Cramer & Hagen (1997) five requalification alternatives are defined. In brief, alternatives 1-
4 are different modifications of the structure to reduce the loading and, except for 
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alternative 3, demanning of the platform. Alternative 5 is platform elimination of the 
structure and replacing it by an underwater connection of the pipelines passing the 
platform. 
The probabilities of collapse, damage and no-failure are shown in table 3 for fill five 
alternatives. 
Name Dr:cl'iion AUemativro 
Pca~l"f))t- 0.071 o.oro 0.002 0.002 0.000 
Po."""" 0 .2.70 0.030 0.023 
0.023 0 .000 
Pu ... n iit.o• U.659 0.960 0.975 0.975 r.nao 
Table 9. Annual occurrence probabilities for the five selected alternatives. Taken from 
Sigurdsson, Cramer & Hagen (1997). 
The corresponding decision problem is formulated in detail in reference Sigurdsson, 
Cramer & Hagen (1997). Based on three attributes: Net profit, safety, and reputation and 
the corresponding utility functions, the conclusion is that alternative 5 should be chosen 
since this alternative has the largest estimate for its utility. 
6.4. Reinforced Concrete Bridges 
This section is based on Thoft-Christensen & Middleton (1997). Throughout the world, 
highway authorities are faced with the task of assessing the strength and safety of their 
existing bridges. There is a need for increasing the load limit for road bridges and it is a 
fact that thousands of bridges have deteriorated significantly. lt is recognised in many 
countries that the management of the bridge stock would require knowledge of the overall 
condition of bridges. 
Several highway authorities have identified the potential for applying reliability-based 
methods for assessing existing bridges. One study is the development of reliability-based 
codes of practice for the structural analysis of concrete bridges. The goal is to develop a 
methodology with which a typical short span concrete bridge could be realistically 
assessed, taking into account the age of the structure and different levels of deterioration. 
For concrete bridges the primary mechanism of deterioration is corrosion of the steel 
reinforcement and hence appropriate models were needed to describe this process. 
The aim is eventually to develop a risk based assessment procedure for concrete bridges 
in which satisfactory structures will be defined in terms of a certain (low) probability of 
failure. By considering the risk of failure at different load levels a simplified assessment 
code suitable for general use by the profession might then be derived. Clearly such a 
procedure will need extensive calibration before being adopted but it does hold out the 
prospect for a rationally based approach to bridge assessment. In particular this 
methodology should enable bridge managers to allocate resources more rationally on the 
basis of risk of failure. 
Several models can be used to model the deterioration of reinforcement steel in concrete 
slabs. However, there is a general agreement that the model presented below is 
acceptable in most cases. Corrosion initiation period refers to the time during which the 
passivation of steel is destroyed and the reinforcement starts to corrode actively. Practical 
experience of bridges in wetter countries like UK shows that chloride ingress is far bigger a 
problem than carbonation. 
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Fick's law of diffusion can represent the rate of chloride penetration into concrete, as a 
function of depth from the concrete surface and time. When corrosion has started the 
diameter of the reinforcement bars is modelled by a linear function in time. An important 
aspect of corrosion in addition to the average corrosion is the maximum penetration 
(pitting of reinforcement). Pitting of reinforcement may have more influence on ·the 
reliability than the average deterioration due to localised much higher weakening of the 
reinforcement. 
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Figure 11. Normalised reinforcement area A!Ao as a function of time for low, medium, and 
high deterioration. Taken from Thoft-Christensen & Middleton (1997). 
In Thoft-Christensen & Middleton (1997) three levels of deterioration are proposed: low 
deterioration, medium deterioration and high deterioration. In figure 11 the sample 
realisations of the history of the reinforcement area for deterioration models: low, medium, 
high are s~own for a specific case. A collapse (yield line) limit state is used. 7 different 
failure modes are considered, see figure 12. 
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Figure 12. Failure modes for simply supported slab bridges. Taken from Thoft-Christensen 
& Middleton (1997). 
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Figure 13. Bridge data. Taken from Thoft-Christensen & Middleton (1997). 
The following example is used to illustrate the applied methodology, see figure 13. The 
example is based on an existing UK bridge built in 1975. 
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Based on the corrosion data for the high corrosion model the expected area of the 
reinforcement as a function of time can be calculated, see figure 14. The normalised 
reliability profile for the yield line ULS (full width failure) and the corresponding probability 
of failure profile are shown in figure 15. The reliability index at the time t=O is ~ =11.5. 
Due to the size of the concrete cover (mean value 60 mm) the deterioration does not have 
any effect until year 70. · 
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Figure 14. Expected relative reinforcement area as a function of time. Taken from Thoft-
Christensen & Middleton (1997). 
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Fig. 15 Reliability profiles using a yield line limit state. Taken from Thoft-Christensen & 
Middleton (1997). 
The results from a sensitivity analysis with regard to the mean values are shown for t=O 
years and t=120 years in figure 16. The most important variables are, as expected, the 
thickness of the slab, the yield strength of the reinforcement, and the model uncertainty. 
Observe that the sensitivity with regard to the cover changes from negative at the time t=O 
to positive at the time t=120 due to the corrosion. 
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· Pig.16. Sensitivity analysis for yield line limit state at t=O and t = 120 years. Taken from 
Thoft-Christensen & Middleton (1997). 
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6.5. Launch Vehicle Propulsion System 
This section is based on Gerez et al. (1997) . The overall cost of a launch system consists 
of several factors such as the expected potential due to catastrophic failure, the 
manufacturing costs, and the operational costs. The potential for catastrophic failure can be 
evaluated by a probabilistic risk assessment. 
In reference Gerez et al. (1997) the risk evaluation methodologies traditionally used in the 
aerospace industry are discussed and demonstrated on the US Space Shuttle. Aerospace 
propulsion has traditionally been based on non-redundant systems. Any failure e.g. in one 
of the engines or in the support systems would result in either failure of the mission, or 
catastrophic loss of the vehicle, depending on the severity of the failure. 
The traditional propulsion concept changed with the design of the NASA Space Shuttle. 
The main propulsion in the Space Shuttle is based on three thrust generation systems. 
However, the main difference between this new concept and earlier designs is that it can 
tolerate certain failures in the main subsystems and/or their support systems, without 
endangering mission or crew. 
Traditional risk analysis was used in the early stages of the Shuttle project. Traditional risk 
analysis only gave a qualitative estimate of the risk of loss of mission and catastrophic loss 
of vehicle, and of the major single point failures in the propulsion system design. However, 
the Challenger accident made it clear that a quantitative risk analysis is needed. At that time 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was being extensively applied by the nuclear power 
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industry to evaluate risk levels. The PRA methodology is a scenario-based technique, which 
characterises accident sequences in an event tree format. Therefore, implementing a similar 
general strategy, the aerospace industry began applying PRA techniques to manned space 
vehicles. 
The primary objective of the Space Shuttle PRA was to support management and 
engineering decision-making with respect to the Shuttle programme by producing (see 
Gerez et al. (1997)): 
• a quantitative probabilistic risk model of the Space Shuttle during flight, 
• a quantitative assessment of in-flight safety risk, 
• an identification and prioritisation of the features of design and operations that principally 
contribute to in-flight safety risk, and 
• a mechanism for risk-based evaluation of proposed modifications to the Shuttle system. 
In addition PRA analyses are innately tailored for the following applications (see Gerez et al. 
(1997)): 
Estimate the frequency of different undesired consequences (mission failure, catastrophic 
loss, delay in the program, etc.) for a complex system throughout its lifecycle (design, 
manufacture, operation, maintenance). 
• Determine _where the project teams should concentrate their efforts, i.e. what factors 
generate the overall risk to the system. · 
• Evaluate which alternatives for design, operation and maintenance represent the least 
risk to the system. 
• Analyse whether a proposed modification reduces the cost-risk ratio sufficiently to justify 
implementation. 
• Identify factors for which uncertainty is high and can be reduced by further tests or 
analyses. 
These capabilities clearly show that PRA has certain advantages over traditional reliability 
and safety analysis techniques. 
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Figure 17. LOV risk uncertainty distributions for the total shuttle mission. Taken from Gerez et 
al. (1997). 
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Using importance analyses, each system component's contribution to the vehicle loss 
frequency can be estimated. This can also be used to evaluate the risk reduction effectiveness 
of a proposed modification to components, equipment or subsystem of the Shuttle. Figure 17 
shows the LOV (Loss Of Vehicle) risk uncertainty distributions for total Shuttle missions for each 
of the main subsystems (STS, Orbiter, SSME (Space Shuttle Main Engines), ISRB (Solid 
Rocket), ET (External Tank), and Landing). 
6.6. Hydraulic Steel Structures 
This section is based on Manen et al. (1997). Application of structural reliability theory in the 
design and assessment of hydraulic engineering structures and flood defence works in the 
Netherlands was enhanced during the damming of the Eastern Scheldt. Advanced techniques 
to assess the structural reliability were used during the design stage as well as during 
construction of the Eastern Scheldt Storm Surge Barrier. 
Figure 18. Storm surge barrier in the New Waterway near Rotterdam. Taken from Manen 
et al. (1997). 
A target failure probability of 1 o-6 per year for the main event "failure of the barrier" was 
chosen. The target failure probability was then split up into target reliabilitys for the 
different substructures by using the following equation 
<D(- fJ •• ) = <1>(- /Jbarrier) Ass.; 
Correlation between substructures is neglected. The value of Dss,i has been defined by the 
structural engineer (designer) for each substructure and varies between zero and one. The 
sum of all Dss,i should be less than or, at most, equal to one. A part of the adopted 
distribution is shown in Fig. 19. 
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Figure 19. Distribution of failure probability to substructure and the design point approach 
for some substructures. 
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For specific elements in the barrier non-linear finite element calculations were performed 
to investigate the ratio of the actual ultimate load capacity and the capacity according to 
the design code. The existing overcapacity in relation to the code for a specific limit state 
can be reduced by a modification of the partial safety factor by: 
Ycodc rM = --
r FEM-cxp 
For the girders in the steel gate, physical and geometrical non-linear finite element 
calculations have been performed. In the calculations a load factor of 2.4 is achieved in 
relation to the basic loads on the model. The girder fails by shear failure of the web below 
a longitudinal stiffener. The admissible load factor according to the design code in relation 
to the basic loads on the model is e.g., 1.76. This gives an overcapacity of the structure in 
relation to the design loads of 2.4/1.76 = 1.36. The partial safety factors for the resistance 
are shown in table 1 0 for the different groups of gate elements. 
Group Y m 
d 
Y m gr 
Girders 1.0 1.35 
Stiffeners 1.0 1.36 
Trusses 1.0 1.28 
Welds 1.25 1.66 
Local girders 1.0 1.33 
Connections of trusses 1.0 1.26 
Supports 1.0 1.25 
Locomotive connections 1.0 1.17 
Table 10. Safety Factors for the different groups. Taken from Manen et al. (1997). 
The partial safety factor in the design code amounts to r m = 1.0 for limit states governed 
by yielding and r m= 1.25 in case of ultimate strength. The larger reliability index and the 
series system behaviour of the substructure gives an increase of the partial safety factor 
by approximately 30 %. 
6.7. Dams 
This section is based on L6pez-Hernandez et al. (1997). Analysis of the reliability of dams 
is performed to quantify the frequency of possible failures of the dams. 
Risk analysis is performed to evaluate the potential consequences of risks. Failures are 
grouped according to type of dam, height and type of foundation and are analysed in terms 
of the source of the information, type of degradation, time of failure relative to the age of 
the dam, methods used to evaluate the damage and the corrective measures taken (see 
reference L6pez-Hernandez et al. (1997)) . 
As mentioned the purpose of the reliability study of a dam is to perform a quantitative 
evaluation of dam safety in terms of failure probability expressed as failures/year. Therefore, 
the first step is to identify possible causes of dam failure. The required data include the type 
of dam, characteristics of the floodplain and terrain, and the existence or not of dams further 
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upstream. The next step is to quantify the possibility of occurrence. The global failure 
probability is obtained from the failure probability for each individual cause of failure: 
• Failures occurring as a result of hydrological action include dam top overspill, erosion of 
the spillway and erosion of the dam downstream facing. 
• Failures occurring as a result of seismic activity include collapse due to earth movement 
high dynamic loads, soil liquefaction causing the structure fall over, displacement of 
embankments and the consequent water wave. 
• Failures occurring as a result of inherent defects include failure of dam foundations, 
structure or abutments. 
• Failure of a dam upstream may occur as a result of any of the aforementioned failures 
and will have an additional impact on the dam downstream. 
The most commonly used approach is based on the collection of experimental data on dam 
behaviour, e.g. the ICOLD database. The failure is then analysed in terms of the source of 
the information, type of degradation, time of failure relative to the age of the dam, methods 
used to evaluate the damage and the corrective measures taken. This database was used to 
evaluate the failure probability of the dams discussed in this document. 
Many factors must be taken into account in a probabilistic study of dams. Firstly, it can be 
stated that modern dams are safer than old ones. Next, the probability of failure is higher 
during construction and in the initial years after construction, when they are being filled for the 
first time. lt then decreases and rises slightly at the end of the dams predictable life. Another 
important factor is the type of dam since. the proportion of failure is higher in embankment 
dams than in concrete dams. The safety study should also take into account the level of 
technology of .the country in question. 
The following annual frequencies of failure were obtained for the three Spanish dams 
considered in L6pez-Herm1ndez et al. (1997), see table 11. 
Dam Annual Frequency of Failure 
Entrepenas p = 2.09 x 1 o-e incidents/year 
Buendia p = 2.16 x 10-6 incidents/year 
Bolarque p = 5.79 x 10-6 incidents/year 
Table 11. 
6.8. Fatigue Assessment of Offshore Structure 
This section is based on Sigurdsson et al. (1997). In Sigurdsson et al. (1997).) an example 
of the fatigue assessment of an eight-legged North Sea jacket structure located at 1 07 m 
water depth is presented. The analysis is a level Ill reliability analysis, where the joint 
probability distribution of the uncertainty parameters is applied in the computation of the 
estimated fatigue failure probabilities. 
A probabilistic S-N fatigue analysis is performed in Sigurdsson et al. (1997). where the 
fatigue damage is calculated using the Miners sum and the S-N curve and the following 
limit state 
g(D,~)=~-D 
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Figure 20. Estimated S-N fatigue reliability of the critical joint as a function of the service 
time. Tak~n from Sigurds.son et al. (1997). 
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Figure 21. Estimated updated fatigue reliability having inspections with no crack detection. 
Taken from Sigurdsson et al. (1997) . 
The estimated fatigue reliability over the service life of the structure is shown in figure 20, 
applying transfer functions derived from both a dynamic and a quasi-static analysis. An 
importance factor analysis shows that the uncertainties related to the S-N curve and the 
estimation of the local stress response are the most important uncertainty contributions to 
the fatigue reliability assessment. 
A probabilistic FM (Fracture Mechanics) fatigue analysis is also performed. The main 
advantage of using the FM fatigue model is that structural inspection results can be 
incorporated for updating the degree of fatigue damage accumulation. A 2-dimensional 
crack propagation model using Paris equation is used. The parameters describing the 
crack propagation were fitted on the basis of the application of the S-N approach. 
In figure 21 the estimated fatigue reliability is shown as a function of time. For all 
inspections an MPI inspection technique is applied where no crack was detected. 
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